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Abstract—The use of electromagnetic glitches has recently
emerged as an effective fault injection technique for the purpose
of conducting physical attacks against integrated circuits. First
research works have shown that electromagnetic faults are
induced by timing constraint violations and that they are also
located in the vicinity of the injection probe. This paper reports
the study of the efficiency of a glitch detector against EM
injection. This detector was originally designed to detect any
attempt of inducing timing violations by means of clock or power
glitches. Because electromagnetic disturbances are more local
than global, the use of a single detector proved to be inefficient.
Our subsequent investigation of the use of several detectors to
obtain a full fault detection coverage is reported, it also provides
further insights into the properties of electromagnetic injection
and into the key role played by the injection probe.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early warning of Quisquater et al. in 2002 [1],
the use of electromagnetic (EM) glitches has recently emerged
as an effective fault injection technique for the purpose of
conducting physical attacks against ICs [2], [3], [4]. These
latter works indicate that the mechanism related to the injec-
tion of faults involves timing constraint violations. The timing
constraint violation is induced by a transient underpowering of
the target created by the EM disturbances. This effect is highly
correlated with the quality of the coupling between the supply
network of the target (the victim) and the injection probe (the
aggressor). Further, the underpowering seems to be more local
than global: faults are located in the vicinity of the injection
probe.
The novelty of this threat explains that no countermeasure
dedicated to cope with EM injection has been yet proposed (to
the best of our knowledge).
There is two other common fault injection means related to
timing violations: clock and power supply glitches. They both
have a global effect (i.e. the disturbance affects the whole
chip). A delay-based countermeasure (CM) has been recently
proposed and validated by [5] to cope with this kind of timing
violation. However, the question of its efficiency against EM
glitches was to be raised. Indeed, an EM disturbance located
away from the actual implementation of the CM may induce
a fault without triggering an alarm.
This paper reports an evaluation of a delay-based CM against
EM glitches. Because a single CM was insufficient to detect
with a high level of confidence EM induced faults, we have
investigated the use of several CMs to attain this purpose.
Conducting these experiments also provides many further
insights into the properties of EM injection: how local its effect
is and how the design of the injection probe may influence the
process.
The contributions of this paper to that research field are:
• the disclosure of guidelines to implement a delay-based
countermeasure against EM injection,
• a study and evidences of its local effect,
• an illustration of the key role of the injection probe,
• a further assessment of the actual threat related to EM
injection.
This article is organized as follows. Section II recalls some
basics related to timing violations, describes the delay-based
countermeasure, and reports its efficiency against clock and
power glitches. Section III describes the experimental set-up
and protocol, presents the experimental results and provides
an interpretation. Finally section IV concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section reminds the mechanisms involved in fault
injection by timing constraint violation. It also describes the
principle of the delay-based countermeasure we designed to
cope with this injection technique. Its efficiency against clock
and power supply glitches is reported likewise.
A. Timing constraint violation
Most digital ICs use one or several synchronous clock
signals to synchronize their internal operations. Data are
released from launch register banks on a clock rising edge,
processed by the logic, and finally latched by capture registers
on the next clock rising edge. Thus, in first approximation,
the clock period (Tclk) has to be greater than the largest
propagation delay of the logic (i.e. its critical time DpMax)
to ensure correct operation. A precise writing of this timing
constraint requires to take into account four other parameters:
Dclk2q , the time spent by a register to release a data after
the clock rising edge; Tskew, the clock skew between launch
and capture registers; Tjitter the clock jitter; and Tsetup, the
setup time of the capture register. The setup time measures the
amount of time a register’s input data must be stable before the
clock’s rising edge to ensure reliable operation. This constraint
expressed in Eq. 1 is called the setup time constraint (note that
we do not describe here the clock pulse width constraint and
the hold time constraint for the sake of brevity).
Tclk > Dclk2q +DpMax + Tsetup + Tskew + Tjitter (1)
The time margin related to eq. 1 is called the time slack
(i.e. the difference between required arrival time and actual
arrival time at the input data of a register). A positive slack
means that eq. 1 is fulfilled, conversely a negative slack is led
to its violation.
The violation of this timing constraint is a straightforward
means to inject faults into a circuit. A setup time violation
arises if the last signal transition is too close to the clock rising
edge (The DFF’s output undergoes a metastable behavior [6]: it
may stabilize either at a high or low state. An error may occur
or not). Then, increasing the stress applied to the chip, an early
latching arises. There is no signal transition during the setup
time and an erroneous value is latched. Hereafter, we will refer
to constraint timing violation for both cases.It exists many
means to obtain a timing constraint violation for the purpose
of injecting faults into an IC. The most common are clock
and power supply glitches that induce a transient violation
of eq. 1. A clock glitch [7] consists in reducing temporarily
the clock period (left handside of eq. 1) to obtain a negative
slack, whereas a power glitch [8] induces a transient increase
of the logic propagation times (right handside of eq. 1). The
next sections report the principle of a countermeasure based
on monitoring the advent of timing violations due to clock or
power glitches, and some experimental validations.
B. The delay-based countermeasure
We have designed a delay-based countermeasure (CM)
against timing violations from the implementation reported by
Endo et al. in [5] (see also [9]). The principle of this CM
consists in detecting the violation of a guarding delay prior to
any timing violation. The clock signal is used as a reference
to be able to draw comparisons between the guarding delay
and the clock period (Tclk). In normal operation the guarding
delay is set greater than the critical time (DpMax), but smaller
than Tclk. By doing so, if Tclk is decreased for the purpose
of inducing a timing violation, it will have to be shorter than
the guarding delay (what we call a guarding delay violation)
before inducing a timing violation. Hence, if the CM is able
to detect this guarding delay violation, it will also be able to
detect any fault injection attempt by clock glitches. Similarly,
if the power supply voltage is decreased for the purpose of
injecting a fault by increasing the target’s critical time, the
guarding delay which depends upon the voltage supply in
a similar way will be increased as well. As a consequence
the violation of the guarding delay will arise and be detected
first. The schematic of the CM depicted in Fig. 1-a fits with
the above mechanisms. The guarding delay (denoted delay)
is implemented with the circuit logic. It is used to obtain a
delayed clock (denoted DCK) from the clock signal (denoted
CK) where DCK(t) = CK(t − delay). A D flip-flop (DFF)
is used as a phase comparator between CK (connected to its














(a)  Glitch detector principle
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Fig. 1. Delay-based countermeasure principle
The design is tuned in order to comply with the timing given
in Eq. 2.
DpMax < delay < Tclk (2)
In normal operation, as depicted in Fig. 1-b, the DFF output
(denoted alarm) is low. Fig. 1-c illustrates the detection of a
power supply glitch. As the power supply voltage is decreased
the guarding delay is increased, it goes larger than Tclk. Thus
a high level is latched by the DFF on the next rising edge
of DCK: the alarm is triggered at high level indicating a fault
injection attempt. For the sake of brevity we have not sketched
the detection of a clock glitch which is very similar. This
countermeasure was first designed to be embedded in an FPGA
running the AES encryption algorithm as described in the next
subsection. We also report in subsection II-D experiments of
its validity against clock and power glitches. The next section
devoted to the study of the effect of EM glitches describes its
efficiency against such perturbations. It will be exposed that
this CM may be used likewise as a test pattern to study the
local effects of EM glitches.
C. Implementation
The experiments reported in this work were carried out on
an FPGA (Xilinx Spartan 700). At first, the CM was embedded
along with a hardware implementation of the AES algorithm
(its 128-bits version). The device was operated at 100MHz at
its nominal power supply (1.2V).
The CM primitive was implemented as a hard macro [10].
It allows to change its location within the logic slices of the
FPGA without modifying its actual architecture after a proper
tuning of the guarding delay has been found. Furthermore,
it ensured that its design was identical after each of the
synthesize and routing steps we have ran. The Xilinx software
’FPGA Editor’ enables the creation of hard macros, which are
manually placed, routed and configured designs, which can be
instantiated multiple times in an FPGA design. This feature can
be exploited to design an exactly defined delay based alarm
and instantiate it several times.
In a second time, while studying more precisely the effect
of EM glitches, several CM primitives were embedded as
described in subsection III-A. Thanks to the use of hard
macros, every instance of the CM was identical (however
because of within-die variations [11] the various CMs may
have different thresholds of triggering).
D. Clock and power supply glitches
As shown in [8] clock and power supply glitches lead to
timing constraint violations that both affect the whole die
(i.e. they have a global effect). Thus, a single countermeasure
should be sufficient to detect any fault injection attempt related
to these techniques. For the purpose of drawing comparisons
while studying the effects of EM glitches, we have first
carried out injection experiments by means of clock and power
glitches. The experimental setup is described in Fig. 6.
Clock glitch injections (several thousands with random data)
were conducted during the 9th round of the AES by shortening
progressively the corresponding clock period from 10ns to
7.2ns. As expected the alarm was always triggered prior to
the injection of the first fault. Fig. 2 reports an example of
the obtained results. The occurrence rates of the triggering of
the alarm (in red) and of the injection of a fault (in blue) are
drawn versus the clock period of the attacked round. A one
hundred percent of detection was recorded before that the fault
occurrence rate started to rise.
Similar experiments were made by means of negative power
supply glitches of 10ns centered on the AES 9th round. Alike,
as shown in Fig. 3, were the occurrence rates are drawn versus
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Fig. 2. Detection of clock glitches.
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Fig. 3. Detection of power supply glitches.
the amplitude of the power glitches, the triggering of the alarm
was always prior to any fault injection.
As a result, it appeared that a single glitch detector is
sufficient to protect the whole FPGA.
III. ELECTROMAGNETIC GLITCHES
This new fault injection means takes advantage of the
presence of the numerous horizontal and vertical loops, in the
routing of the power and ground networks, to inject sudden
variations of the current flowing through. These sudden current
variations produce voltage drops and ground bounces that alter
the propagation of signals through the logic and therefore
induce timing faults. Thus, they produce an effect similar to
that of voltage glitches. However, because of the locality of
the EM coupling, EM spikes can be locally injected, anywhere,
in the IC resulting in an injection that could be sufficiently
local to get round a single glitch detector usually located in
the neighborhood of supply pads or of the on-chip voltage
regulator.
The following experiments have several goals. The first one
is to characterize the spatial limitation of the aforementioned
CM. This also demonstrates the locality of EM glitches, our
second goal. Finally, the last goal of these experiments is to
demonstrate that handmade probes designed according to some
of the recommendations of [12] are able to concentrate intense
and powerful magnetic fields on reduced areas.
A. The FPGA implementation
EM injection experiments were conducted on an FPGA
implementing the AES algorithm and five glitch detectors.
Fig. 4-b shows the floorplan, the placement and the routing
of the AES and glitch detectors mapped into the FPGA. The
location of the detectors is highlighted with red squares. Fig.
4-a presents a front view of the opened device after chemical
decapsulation, it allows determining the size and location of
the silicon die (underlined in black). This choice was done
in order to try to detect any EM glitch penetrating in the IC
at any point of the IC surface. At this point, this choice of
five detectors as well as their position was done from purely
geometric considerations.
Fig. 4. (a) Test chip after front side decapsulation and (b) AES (blue) and
CMs (red squares) implementation within the design floor plan
B. Electromagnetic Glitch
The EM injection probes were handmade probes. They are
made up of a ferrite core end around which a copper wire is
enclosed to form 4-5 turns (see Fig. 5). During the experiments
two different probes were used. One, denoted ’G’, with a
diameter of 3000µm and a flat tip end; the second, denoted
’F’, with a ferrite core of 500µm with a sharp tip end of
diameter of 300µm according to recommendations of [12]. To
produce EM glitches a voltage pulse generator (4A and 20V-
200V pulse capability) was adopted. It delivers pulses with a
duration ranging from 10ns to 100ns to the EM probes. To
access the EM glitch susceptibility of the IC as well as the
efficiency of the glitch detectors, a motorized stage was used
to scan the IC surface and its neighborhood using the EM glitch
Fig. 5. The two EM injection probes
platform (see Fig. 6). The scanned area was 14.4× 14.4mm2
while the silicon die area (white square in cartographies) was
5.6×5mm2. A same displacement step of 400µm was chosen
along the XY axis. At each location of the injection probe, 20
EM glitches were induced. As a result it takes about 220min.
to perform a full cartography.
Using this platform, several EM glitch cartographies (tar-
geting the AES 9th round) were launched with both probes G
and F and pulses of different amplitudes were used to modify
both the power and the resolution of the injections. During
these cartographies, the output of the glitch detectors (alarms)
as well as the ciphertexts were monitored.
C. Spatial limitation of glitch detectors
Fig. 7 displays the cartography showing the triggering rate
of the alarm located in the bottom right part of the floorplan
while Fig. 8 gives a cartography of the fault injection rate. Both
were obtained with probe G and 200V pulse amplitude. 1296
probe locations were investigated to draw the cartography,
corresponding to 25360 EM glitches. The alarm was triggered
7308 times. From Fig. 7 one may conclude that one glitch
detector is not sufficient to detect all EM glitches produced
above the die (the white rectangle) and its close vicinity.
From Fig. 8 one may conclude that this alarm, which was
detecting absolutely all voltage or clock glitches, is not able
to detect all EM glitches producing faults. There is, indeed,
several locations in the right bottom part of the investigated
area that have one hundred fault injection rates while having a
zero detection rate. From the 1935 faults actually injected, 80
were undetected. Moreover, this demonstrates that EM glitch
has a local effect contrarily to voltage or clock glitches which
are global.
D. Enhancing the robustness of the IC against EM glitches
The above results show that our detector has a wide,
but insufficient, area of detection. Indeed all EM glitches
attempts are not detected. It is therefore mandatory to integrate
several detectors. This explains why five detectors have been
integrated. Fig. 9 shows the detection rate of EM glitches
obtained by considering the answers of the five detectors rather
than the answer of a single one. The detection area was clearly
Fig. 6. Experimental setup
Fig. 7. Cartography of the triggering rate of the alarm - 1 detector (Probe
G, pulse amplitude equal to 200V).
Fig. 8. Fault occurrence rate w.r.t. the probe tip end position (Probe G, pulse
amplitude equal to 200V).
TABLE I
OVERHEAD OF THE GLITCH DETECTORS
Number Overhead
of used slices
None Protected AES 2741
AES + 1 Glitch detector 2750 0.3 %
AES + 5 Glitch detectors 2785 1.6 %
extended. Table I reports the overhead in terms of the area used
by the glitch detectors.
E. Number of detectors
Considering the above results, one may wonder about the
number of glitch detectors a designer has to integrate to secure
an IC. If the answer depends of course on the quality of the
detectors, it also depends on the resolution of the EM injection
probes that the adversaries may use and of the pulse amplitude
Fig. 9. Cartography of the alarm triggering rate - 5 detectors (Probe G, pulse
amplitude equal to 200V).
required to inject a fault (i.e. the EM susceptibility of the IC).
Fig. 10. Rate of triggering of at least one alarm among the five alarms with
Probes G (flat tip end 3000µm) and F (sharp tip end 300µm) with pulse
amplitude equal to 200V, 100V or 75V.
Indeed Fig. 10 shows the triggering rate of at least one
alarm among the five alarms with probe G and F and pulse
amplitudes equal to 200V, 100V or 75V while Fig. 11 gives the
fault injection rates. Note that these rates are drawn according
the same color scale used in previous cartographies.
25530 EM glitches were injected to draw each cartography.
With probe G at 200V pulse amplitude, the alarm triggering
rate (at least one alarm out of five triggered) was 32%, 1995
faults were induced which were always detected. At 100V
amplitude, the alarm triggering rate was 21%, 1052 faults were
injected. 8 of these injected faults were undetected. With probe
F at 100V pulse amplitude, the alarm triggering rate was 6%
Fig. 11. Fault injection rate with Probes G (flat tip end 3000µm) and F
(sharp tip end 300µm) with pulse amplitude equal to 200V, 100V or 75V.
and 133 faults were induced from which 12 were not detected.
At 75V pulse amplitude with probe F, the alarm triggering
rate was 5.1% and 115 faults were induced. Five faults were
undetected. The decrease of the alarm triggering rate as the
pulse amplitude or the probe size were decreased was expected
because a smaller voltage pulse amplitude induces a weaker
EM disturbance. However, the design of probe F makes it
possible to defeat the detection capability of the five glitch
detectors simultaneously with a success rate slightly above
10%.
Therefore the use of five glitch detectors may not be
sufficient or their placement not optimal depending on the
resolution of the injection probe. However, despite succeeding
in injecting a small number of undetected faults, the feasibility
of the attack is questionable. Indeed, many fault injection
attempts would have been detected first and an adapted answer
to that threat should have been taken [7].
One may also observe that the detection area is slightly
narrower when reducing the pulse amplitude and much more
narrow when the resolution of the EM probe is enhanced. This
latter experimental results confirms that the use of ferrite rods
with a sharp end allows to concentrate the magnetic field on
reduced surface (as expected from the simulation results of
[12]) and therefore:
• to enhance the spatial resolution of EM injection probes,
• to get around efficient glitch detectors designed to detect
clock and power spikes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, EM glitch was compared to voltage and clock
glitch fault injection techniques. If clock and voltage glitches
can be thwarted by the use of a single delay-based glitch
detector, we experimentally highlighted that the use of a single
detector may not be sufficient to thwart EM glitch based fault
attacks. Additionally, we had experimentally demonstrated that
the use of ferrite rods with sharp end allows enhancing the
spatial resolution of the EM glitches. Finally, the efficiency
of glitch detector (based on the monitoring of delay at least)
in detecting EM pulses has been pointed out. However, the
number of detectors to be used as well as their optimal
placement on the IC surface remain an open problems.
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